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INTRODUCTION
Systematic reviews show that clinical decision 
support systems (CDSSs) can improve the 
quality of clinical decisions and healthcare 
processes1 and patient outcomes2; although 
caution has been expressed as to balancing 
the risks of using CDSSs (eg, alert fatigue) 
when only small or moderate improvements 
to patient care have been shown.3 Yet, despite 
the potential benefits, studies indicate that 
uptake of these tools in clinical practice is 
generally low due to a range of factors.4–7 The 
well- funded National Health Service (NHS) 
PRODIGY programme is an example of a 
carefully developed CDSS - commissioned 
by the Department of Health to support 
GPs - which failed to influence clinical prac-
tice or patient outcomes, with low uptake by 
clinicians in a large- scale trial.8 A subsequent 
qualitative study revealed that, among other 
issues—such as the timing of the advice—
trust was an issue: ‘I don't trust … practising 
medicine like that … I do not want to find 
myself in front of a defence meeting, in front 
of a service tribunal, a court, defending myself 
on the basis of a trial of computer guidelines’ 
[quote from GP].9
Another qualitative study exploring factors 
hindering CDSSs' uptake in hospital settings 
found that clinicians perceive that CDSSs 
‘may reduce their professional autonomy 
or may be used against them in the event of 
medical- legal controversies’.10 Thus, CDSSs 
may be ‘perceived as limiting, rather than 
supplementing, physicians’ competencies, 
expertise and critical thinking’, as opposed 
to a working tool to augment professional 
competence and encourage interdisciplinary 
working in healthcare settings.10 Similarly, a 
recent survey carried out by the Royal College 
of Physicians revealed that senior physicians 
had serious concerns about using CDSSs in 
clinical practice, with trust and trustworthi-
ness being key issues (see examples below).11
Trust is an important foundation for rela-
tionships between the developers of informa-
tion systems and users, and is a contemporary 
concern for policymakers. It has, for example, 
been highlighted in the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) report12; the Topol Review13; a number 
of European Commission communica-
tions,14–16 reports17–20 and most recently a 
White Paper on AI21; and investigated in the 
context of knowledge systems, for example, 
for Wikipedia.22 Although it is an important 
concept, it is not always defined; rather, its 
meaning may be inferred. For example, the 
House of Lords Select Committee used the 
phrase ‘public trust’ eight times,12 but the 
core concern appeared to be about confi-
dence over the use of patient data, rather 
than patient perceptions regarding the effi-
cacy (or otherwise) of the AI in question. 
Such documents appear to take an implicit or 
one- directional approach to what is meant by 
‘trust’.
Notably, the Guidelines of the High- Level 
Expert Group on AI outline seven key require-
ments that might make AI systems more trust-
worthy17; whereas the White Paper focuses 
on fostering an ‘ecosystem of trust’ through 
the development of a clear European regula-
tory framework with a risk- based approach.21 
Therefore, in keeping with the drive for 
promoting clinical adoption of AI and CDSSs 
while minimising the potential risks,13 here 
we apply Onora O’Neill’s23 24 multidirec-
tional trust and trustworthiness framework25 
to explore key issues underlying clinician 
(doctor, nurse or therapist) trust in and the 
use (or non- use) of AI and CDSS tools for 
advising them about patient management, 
and the implications for CDSS developers. 
In doing so, we do not seek to examine 
particular existing CDSSs’ merits and flaws 
in- depth, nor do we address the merits of the 
deployment process itself. Rather, we focus 
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on generic issues of trust that clinicians report having 
about CDSSs’ properties, and on improving clinician 
trust in the use and outputs of CDSSs that have already 
been deployed.
Two points merit attention at this stage. First, O’Neill’s25 
framework is favoured as—in the words of Karen Jones—
O’Neill ‘has done more than anyone to bring into theo-
retical focus the practical problem that would- be trusters 
face: how to align their trust with trustworthiness’.26 
Second, some nuance is required when determining 
who or what is being trusted. For example, Annette Baier 
makes clear that her own account of trust supposes:
that the trusted is always something capable of good 
or ill will, and it is unclear that computers or their 
programs, as distinct from those who designed them, 
have any sort of will. But my account is easily extended 
to firms and professional bodies, whose human office- 
holders are capable of minimal goodwill, as well as of 
disregard and lack of concern for the human persons 
who trust them. It could also be extended to artificial 
minds, and to any human products, though there I 
would prefer to say that talk of trusting products like 
chairs is either metaphorical, or is shorthand for talk 
of trusting those who produced them.27
Similarly, Joshua James Hatherley ‘reserve[es] the label 
of ‘trust’ for reciprocal relations between beings with 
agency’.28 Accordingly, our focus is on the application 
of O’Neill’s25 framework to CDSS developers as ‘trusted’ 
agents, and measures they could adopt to become more 
trustworthy.
O’Neill’s trust and trustworthiness framework: A summary
O’Neill notes that ‘trust is valuable when placed in trust-
worthy agents and activities, but damaging or costly when 
(mis)placed in untrustworthy agents and activities’.25 She 
usefully disaggregates trust into three core but related 
elements:
1. Trust in the truth claims made by others, such as claims 
about a CDSS’s accuracy made by its developer. These 
claims are empirical, since their correctness can be 
tested by evaluating the CDSS.29
Trust in others’ commitments or reliability to do what 
they say they will, such as clinicians trusting a develop-
er to maintain and update their CDSS products. This 
is normative: we use our understanding of the world 
and the actors in it to judge the plausibility of a specific 
commitment, such as our bank honouring its commit-
ment to send us statements.
2. Trust in others’ competence or practical expertise to 
meet those commitments. This is again normative: we 
use our knowledge of the agent in whom we place our 
trust and our past experience of their actions to judge 
their competence, such as trust in our dentist’s ability 
to extract our tooth and the ‘skill and good judgement 
she brings to the extraction’.25
This approach utilises two ‘directions of fit’: the empir-
ical element (1) in one direction (does the claim ‘fit’ the 
world as it is?), and the two normative elements (2-3) 
in another (does the action ‘fit’ the claim?).25 Relat-
edly, O’Neill has written on the concept of ‘judgement’; 
drawing a distinction between judgement in terms of 
looking at the world and assessing how it measures up 
(or ‘fits’) against certain standards (normative), versus an 
initial factual judgement of what a situation is, which ‘has 
to fit the world rather than to make the world fit or live up 
to’ a principle (empirical).30
In deciding whether to trust and use a CDSS, a user 
is similarly also making judgements about it. O’Neill’s 
threefold framework may therefore provide a helpful way 
to examine the issues in this context. In the following 
sections we discuss how CDSS developers can use each 
component of this framework to increase their trustwor-
thiness, and conclude with suggestions on how informa-
ticians might fruitfully apply this framework more widely 
to understand and improve user–developer relationships. 
Inevitably, this theoretical approach cannot address every 
potential issue, but it is used here as a means of organ-
ising diverse concerns around trust issues into a coherent 
framework.
TRUSTING THE TRUTH CLAIMS MADE BY DEVELOPERS
CDSS developers might assume that their users are inter-
ested in the innovative machine learning or knowledge 
representation method used, or how many lines of code 
the CDSS incorporates. However, Petkus et al’s11 recent 
survey of the views and experience of 19 senior UK physi-
cians representing the views of a variety of specialties 
provides some evidence of what a body of senior clini-
cians expect from CDSSs, that developers can use to 
shape their truth claims and build clinical trust. While 
this is not generalisable/representative of all clinicians it 
does provide a useful illustration of clinical concerns, and 
our intent is to demonstrate how applying O’Neill’s trust/
trustworthiness framework might help our understanding 
of how to mitigate these issues. Table 1 shows the six clin-
ical concerns about CDSSs which scored highest in the 
analysis. The score combines both the participant- rated 
Table 1 Concerns about CDSS quality in Petkus et al 
survey
Concerns about CDSS quality Score
The accuracy of advice may be insufficient for 
clinical benefit
15.5
How extensively was clinical effectiveness of CDSS 
tested
15
Whether CDSSs are based on the latest evidence 14.5
CDSSs can interrupt clinical workflow or disrupt 
consultations
14.5
CDSSs can ignore patient preferences 12.5
Whether the CDSS output is worded clearly 11.5
CDSS, clinical decision support systems.
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severity of the concern and its frequency in the responses; 
the maximum score on this scale was 19:11
The greatest concerns here relate to O’Neill’s concept 
(or direction of fit) of empirical trust. Whether the advice 
provided by a CDSS is correct, has strong evidence for its 
clinical effectiveness from testing etc. ultimately concerns 
whether its advice ‘fits’ or matches (eg, in diagnosis) the 
patient’s actual condition. Can it (and/or the people that 
designed/made it) be trusted in an empirical sense of 
being factually correct?
What kind of truth claims may appeal to clinicians?
Drawing on the evidence in table 1, developers should 
report to clinicians: the accuracy of the advice or risk 
estimates; CDSS effectiveness (impact on patients, deci-
sions and the NHS); whether the CDSS content matches 
current best evidence (see 'Guidelines: codes and stan-
dards frameworks' below); its usability and ease of use in 
clinical settings; whether its output is worded clearly, and if 
takes account of patient preferences. These claims should 
be phrased in professional language, avoiding the extrav-
agant claims about AI often seen in the press.31 32 Instead 
of different developers adopting a range of metrics for 
reporting study results there is a need for a standard 
CDSS performance reporting ‘label’ for these assess-
ments, to help clinicians identify, compare and judge the 
empirical claims being made about competing CDSSs. 
This is by analogy with European Union (EU) consumer 
regulations dictating how, for example, tyre manufac-
turers report on road noise, braking performance and 
fuel economy for their tyres (figure 1),33 and EU plans 
for a health app label.
Ensuring that the truth claims can be verified
First, CDSS developers should be aware of the ‘evidence- 
based medicine’ culture,34 reflected in the top three 
concerns in table 1. This means that, before clinicians 
make decisions such as how to treat a patient or which 
CDSS to use, they look for well designed, carefully 
conducted empirical studies in typical clinical settings 
using widely accepted outcomes that answer well- 
structured questions. This entails a ‘critical appraisal’ 
process to identify and reject studies that are badly 
designed or conducted, or from settings or with patients 
that do not resemble those where the CDSS will be used.34 
So, it has long been established that empirical evaluation 
and the evidence it generates are crucial to generating 
trust.29 However, a systematic review of empirical research 
has shown that, when CDSS developers themselves carried 
out the study, they were three times as likely to generate 
positive results as when an independent evaluator did 
so.35 Therefore, studies that establish these truth claims 
should be carried out by independent persons or bodies. 
To counter suspicions of bias or selective reporting, the 
full study protocol and results should be made openly 
available, for example, by publication.36 37 Again, there is 
Figure 1 Example of an EU tyre label and how to interpret it.38











: first published as 10.1136/bm




4 Jones C, et al. BMJ Health Care Inform 2021;28:e100247. doi:10.1136/bmjhci-2020-100247
Open access 
an opportunity to establish standard methods for carrying 
out performance or impact studies, so that clinicians can 
trust and compare study results on different CDSSs from 
different suppliers—as exemplified by EU tyre perfor-
mance testing standards.33 38
Concerns that software developers raise about evalu-
ating CDSS are that these studies are expensive and can 
take a lot of time,37 so yield results that can be obsolete by 
the time they are available. However, choosing the right 
designs such as MOST (multiphase optimization strategy), 
SMART (sequential multiple assignment randomized 
trial), or A/B testing (randomized control experiment to 
compare two versions, A and B)39 means that studies can 
be carried out rapidly and at low cost. Further, if the study 
not only meets the requirements of the EU Regulation on 
Medical Devices (see 'UK and EU Regulation on Medical 
Devices' below), but also provides strong foundations for 
clinical trust in the CDSS developers, then commissioned 
independent studies can show a very positive return on 
investment and could be justified as part of a CDSS’s 
product marketing strategy.
TRUSTING OTHERS’ COMMITMENTS
O’Neill asks whether we can trust what others say they 
will do.23 Petkus et al’s11 survey also asked clinicians about 
professional practice, ethics and liability matters, as 
table 2 shows:
The last two items in table 2 relate to issues of empir-
ical trust (is the advice factually correct?), which can be 
addressed by following the suggestions in the section on 
'Trusting the truth claims made by developers' above. 
However, the first two concerns (and those found by Libe-
rati et al10) address not only whether the CDSS provides 
correct advice, but also whether it does what it claims 
to do. Clinicians are unable to evaluate concerns about 
a ‘black- box’ CDSS because they will likely have no idea 
about how answers have been arrived at: it demands faith 
from clinicians that the trust commitments will be met. 
Rather than a useful support to their practice, such a 
CDSS may be considered a hindrance to the exercise of 
clinicians’ judgement and critical thinking—as in the trial 
of PRODIGY (a clinical decision support tool commis-
sioned by the Department of Health to help GPs).8 There 
are related concerns about legal liability. What if the clini-
cian relies on the CDSS and this causes harm to a patient? 
The clinician must trust that a ‘black- box’ CDSS will do 
what it is supposed to, and not cause harm for which they 
may be held legally responsible. Harm could obviously be 
caused by the CDSS if it is not working as the developers 
intended (eg, due to software issues). However, even 
without such issues, if the CDSS utilises a deep learning 
method such as neural networks, the clinician still has to 
trust that the mechanism through which conclusions have 
been derived is sensible, and has only taken into account 
clinically relevant details, ignoring spurious information 
such as the patient’s name or the presence of a ruler in 
images of a suspicious skin lesion.40
In terms of potential legal liability, the situation does 
indeed appear to be unclear. Searches we carried out 
in legal databases (Lexis Library, Westlaw, BAILII), and 
PubMed, for terms around CDSS (adviser, expert system, 
risk score, algorithm, flowchart, automated tool, etc) 
turned up blank; nor have other researchers been able to 
locate published decisions in the UK, Europe or USA.41 
However, it is well established that clinicians are legally 
responsible for the medical advice and treatment given 
to their patients, irrespective of the use of a CDSS.42 They 
must still reach the standard of the reasonable clinician in 
the circumstances. This makes it all the more important, 
if clinical uptake is to be improved, that clinicians have 
reasons to trust the CDSS developers and in turn their 
products/services.43
How can CDSS developers facilitate this trust?
While developers cannot fix an uncertain legal frame-
work, there are several steps they can take to nurture 
trust in this area. Most obviously, to ensure that the way 
the CDSS works and comes to its conclusions are made as 
clear as possible to users. It may not be realistic to do so 
completely, particularly as CDSS software becomes more 
complex via machine learning.44 However, giving—where 
possible—some account of the mechanism for how deci-
sions are arrived at; the quality, size and source of any 
data- sets relied on; and assurance that standard guide-
lines for training the algorithm were followed (as well as 
monitoring appropriate learning diagnostics) will prob-
ably assuage some clinicians’ concerns.44
In addition, even if some ‘black- box’ elements are 
unavoidable, clinicians’ anxieties regarding the depend-
ability or commitment aspects of O’Neill’s23 trust frame-
work may be alleviated by ensuring that frequent updates, 
fixes and support are all available. This should help clini-
cians feel more confident that the CDSS is likely to be 
reliable, and gives them something concrete to point 
to later to evidence their diligence and reasonableness, 
for example if they appear in court or at a professional 
conduct hearing.9–11
Table 2 Concerns about professional practice, ethics and 
liability in Petkus et al survey
Concerns about professional practice, ethics 
and liability Score
The legal liability of doctors who rely on CDSS 
advice is unclear
17.5
Some CDSSs act like a ‘black box’, with no insight 
possible for the user about how they arrived at 
their advice or conclusions
15
Doctors may follow incorrect CDSS advice, even if 
they would make correct decisions without it
13.5
CDSSs can embed unconscious bias, with some 
patient groups receiving unfair care as a result
12.5
CDSS, clinical decision support systems.
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TRUSTING OTHERS’ COMPETENCE
O’Neill23 suggests that we ask whether others’ actions 
meet, or will meet, the relevant standards or norms 
of competence. Factors that may impact positively on 
improving clinician trust include, but are not limited to, 
those listed in box 1.
In this section, we focus on the technical standards,45 
and current codes of practice and development standards 
frameworks potentially applicable to CDSSs.46 47 Much 
more could be said about these approval processes than 
space permits here. However, the point is not to analyse 
the merits of the approval processes, but to illustrate how 
O’Neill’s framework helps to highlight their additional 
importance (beyond being strictly required) as a way to 
enhance (normative) trust.
UK and EU Regulation on Medical Devices
The initial question is whether CDSSs are medical devices? 
Classification as a medical device means that a CDSS will 
be subject to the EU Regulation on Medical Devices.45 The 
European Medicines Agency (the agency responsible for 
the evaluation and safety monitoring of medicines in the 
EU) states that ‘medical devices are products or equipment 
intended generally for a medical use’.48 Article 1 stipulates 
that ‘medical devices’, manufactured for use in human 
beings for the purpose of, inter alia, diagnosis, prevention, 
monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease, means: ‘any 
instrument, apparatus, appliance, software, material or other 
article, whether used alone or in combination, including the 
software intended by its manufacturer to be used specifically 
for diagnostic and/or therapeutic purposes and necessary 
for its proper application’.45
In the UK, the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regu-
latory Agency (MHRA) has indicated that a CDSS is ‘usually 
considered a medical device when it applies automated 
reasoning such as a simple calculation, an algorithm or a 
more complex series of calculations. For example, dose 
calculations, symptom tracking, clinicians (sic) guides to help 
when making decisions in healthcare’.49 Hence, although 
some CDSSs may fall outside this definition (eg, by providing 
information only), our analysis is directed at those that do fall 
within the meaning of medical devices.
Accordingly, developers must adhere to the require-
ments of the EU Medical Devices Regulation45 and post- 
Brexit, under domestic legislation, namely the Medicines 
and Medical Devices Act 2021.50 These requirements 
include passing a conformity assessment carried out by an 
EU- recognised notified body (for medical devices for sale 
in both Northern Ireland and the EU), or a UK approved 
body (for products sold in England, Wales and Scotland)51 to 
confirm that the CDSS meets the essential requirements (the 
precise assessment route depends on the classification of the 
device).52 The focus of this testing is safety. Following confir-
mation that the device meets the essential requirements, a 
declaration of conformity must be made and a CE mark must 
be visibly applied to the device prior to it being placed on the 
market53 (from 1 January 2021 the UKCA (UK Conformity 
Assessed) mark has been available for use in England, Wales 
and Scotland,54 and the UKNI (UK Northern Ireland) mark 
for use in Northern Ireland).55 The general obligations of 
manufacturers are provided in Article 10 of the EU Medical 
Devices Regulation, including risk management, clinical eval-
uation, postmarket surveillance and processes for reporting 
and addressing serious incidents45; see also the ‘yellow card’ 
scheme operated by the MHRA which allows clinicians or 
members of the public to report issues with medical devices.56 
Clinical users will rightly mistrust any CDSS developer who is 
unaware of these regulations, or fails to follow them carefully.
Nevertheless, NHSX (the organisation tasked with setting 
the overall strategy for digital transformation in the NHS) is 
seeking to ‘streamline’ the assurance process of digital health 
technologies.57 Similarly, in the USA, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) is piloting an approach where devel-
opers demonstrating ‘a culture of quality and organisational 
excellence based on objective criteria’ could be precerti-
fied.58 Such ‘trusted’ developers could then benefit from less 
onerous FDA approval processes for their future products 
due to their demonstrable competence.25
Guidelines: codes and standards frameworks
In addition to the generic Technology Code of Practice59 
which should inform developers’ practices, there are two 
sets of guidance specifically focused on the development 
and use of digital health tools, including data- derived 
AI tools for patient management – one issued by the 
Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) and NHS 
Box 1 Developer actions that suggest competence and 
commitment to producing high quality clinical decision 
support systems (CDSSs)
 ► Recruit and retain a good development team with the right skills.58
 ► Use the right set of programming tools and safety- critical soft-
ware engineering processes and methods, for example, HAZOP 
(Hazard and Operability Analysis) to understand and limit the risks 
of CDSSs.17 60
 ► Carry out detailed user research for example, user- centred design 
workshops; establish an online user community and monitor it for 
useful insights; or form a multidisciplinary steering group of key 
stakeholders.13 61
 ► Obtain the best quality, unbiased data to train the algorithm; use 
the right training method and diagnostics to monitor the learning 
process.46
 ► Implement relevant technical standards, obtain a CE mark 
(Conformitè Europëenne: the EU's mandatory conformity mark by 
which manufacturers declare that their products comply with the 
legal requirements regulating goods sold in the European Economic 
Area) for their CDSS as a medical device.45
 ► Publish an open interface to their software; carry out interoperability 
testing.62 63
 ► Build on a prior track record of similar products that appeared safe.58
 ► Follow relevant codes of practice for artificial intelligence and data- 
based technologies.46 47
 ► Implement continuing quality improvement methods, for example, 
log and respond to user comments and concerns60; deliver updates 
to the CDSS regularly61; seek to become certified as ISO 9000 
compliant.
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England,46 and the second by the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE).47
The DHSC and NHS England code of conduct aims 
to complement existing frameworks, including the EU 
Regulation and CE mark process, to ‘help to create a 
trusted environment’,46 supporting innovation that 
is safe, evidence based, ethical, legal, transparent and 
accountable. It refers to the ‘Evidence standards frame-
work for digital health technologies’ developed by 
NICE in conjunction with NHS England, NHS Digital, 
Public Health England, MedCity and others.47 The aim 
of this standards framework is to facilitate better under-
standing by developers (and others) as to what ‘good 
levels of evidence for digital healthcare technologies 
look like’,47 and is applicable to technologies using AI 
with fixed algorithms; whereas those using adaptive 
algorithms are instead governed by the DHSC code (see 
Principle 7).46
Visible and/or certified compliance with these codes 
and standards would provide developers with normative 
objective standards to meet, and point clinical users of 
CDSSs to evidence of their competence.25 Having confi-
dence in the professionalism of the developers should 
go some way towards reassuring clinicians as to the 
safety, accuracy and efficacy of CDSSs, thus potentially 
fostering greater uptake in practice.
CONCLUSION
O’Neill’s25 approach to trust and trustworthiness, 
focusing on empirical trust in developers’ truth claims 
and normative trust in their commitment and compe-
tence to meet those claims, has proved a useful frame-
work to analyse and identify ways that developers 
can improve user trust in them, and in turn—it is 
suggested—the CDSSs they produce. That is, of course, 
not to suggest that developers are necessarily at fault 
in any way. It may be that they are unfairly distrusted 
by (potential) users. We suggest the application of 
O’Neill’s framework has helped to identify ways to facil-
itate and enhance trust in developers, and by extension, 
their CDSSs.
In summary, developers should:
 ► Make relevant claims about system content, perfor-
mance and impact framed in professional language, 
preferably structured to a standard that allows clini-
cians to compare claims about competing CDSSs. 
These claims need to be supported by well- designed 
empirical studies, conducted by independent 
evaluators.
 ► Minimise ‘black box’ elements, ensure that internal 
mechanisms are—so far as possible—explained to 
users, and that CDSS software comes with a compre-
hensive update and support package. This could help 
clinicians gain a sense of control over the CDSS, and 
thus perceive the technology as a valuable working 
tool that complements their own skills and expertise.
 ► Comply with all relevant legal and regulatory (codes 
and standards) frameworks. Having confidence in the 
professionalism and competence of the developers 
should go some way towards reassuring clinicians as to 
the safety, accuracy and efficacy of CDSSs, thus poten-
tially fosteing greater uptake in their use.
The benefit of applying O’Neill’s23 framework is that 
it requires us to consider issues associated with different 
facets of both trust and trustworthiness, maximising 
the possibilities for enhancing trust and trustworthi-
ness once such concerns or objections are overcome. 
An implicit or one- directional understanding of trust 
might result in a narrower conclusion, focused on just 
one element of O’Neill’s framework.25 For example, an 
understanding solely based on normative competence 
might focus on the importance of complying with the 
regulations (not only to avoid sanctions, but to enhance 
trust); this is important, but O’Neill’s framework 
demands consideration of different, equally useful, 
elements of trustworthiness.
This analysis is focused on clinician use of decision 
support tools, but we believe that a similar analysis 
would generate useful insights had we looked at other 
users and information systems, such as the public use of 
risk assessment apps, or professional use of electronic 
referral or order communication system advisory tools. 
The principles of examining the empirical truth claims 
of the software and the evidence on which they are 
based, then the competence of the supplier to match 
these claims and their commitment to do so, seems to 
generate useful insights no matter who the users are or 
what digital service is being trusted. Thus, we suggest 
that O’Neill’s25 framework is considered by health and 
care informaticians—both those developing and eval-
uating digital services—as a useful tool to help them 
explore and expand user trust in these products and 
services.
Contributors All authors designed and cowrote the draft of the paper. CJ took 
primary responsibility for wider materials on trust and the section on 'Trusting 
others' competence'. JT carried out the literature review and led on the section on 
'Trusting others' commitments'. JCW contributed points about the evidence base 
for CDSSs, as well as designing the survey which partly stimulated this work, and 
led on the section on 'Trusting the truth claims made by developers'. All authors 
critically reviewed and edited the final draft.
Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any 
funding agency in the public, commercial or not- for- profit sectors.
Competing interests JW is receiving consultancy payments from NHSX AI Lab for 
advising on the validation and evaluation of AI systems for the NHS, but the views 
shared in this article are his own. The authors declare no other competing interest 
that might be relevant to the views expressed in this article.
Patient consent for publication Not required.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.
Open access This is an open access article distributed in accordance with 
the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY- NC 4.0) license, 
which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non- 
commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the 
original work is properly cited, appropriate credit is given, any changes made 
indicated, and the use is non- commercial. See: http:// creativecommons. org/ 
licenses/ by- nc/ 4. 0/.











: first published as 10.1136/bm




7Jones C, et al. BMJ Health Care Inform 2021;28:e100247. doi:10.1136/bmjhci-2020-100247
Open access
ORCID iDs
Caroline Jones http:// orcid. org/ 0000- 0001- 7632- 9468
James Thornton http:// orcid. org/ 0000- 0001- 7847- 5696
Jeremy C Wyatt http:// orcid. org/ 0000- 0001- 7008- 1473
REFERENCES
 1 Roshanov PS, Fernandes N, Wilczynski JM, et al. Features of 
effective computerised clinical decision support systems: meta- 
regression of 162 randomised trials. BMJ 2013;346:f657.
 2 Varghese J, Kleine M, Gessner SI, et al. Effects of computerized 
decision support system implementations on patient outcomes 
in inpatient care: a systematic review. J Am Med Inform Assoc 
2018;25:593–602.
 3 Kwan JL, Lo L, Ferguson J, et al. Computerised clinical decision 
support systems and absolute improvements in care: meta- analysis 
of controlled clinical trials. BMJ 2020;370:m3216.
 4 Moxey A, Robertson J, Newby D, et al. Computerized clinical 
decision support for prescribing: provision does not guarantee 
uptake. J Am Med Inform Assoc 2010;17:25–33.
 5 Kortteisto T, Komulainen J, Mäkelä M, et al. Clinical decision support 
must be useful, functional is not enough: a qualitative study of 
computer- based clinical decision support in primary care. BMC 
Health Serv Res 2012;12:349.
 6 Patterson ES, Doebbeling BN, Fung CH, et al. Identifying barriers 
to the effective use of clinical reminders: bootstrapping multiple 
methods. J Biomed Inform 2005;38:189–99.
 7 Pope C, Halford S, Turnbull J, et al. Using computer decision 
support systems in NHS emergency and urgent care: ethnographic 
study using normalisation process theory. BMC Health Serv Res 
2013;13:111.
 8 Eccles M, McColl E, Steen N, et al. Effect of computerised evidence 
based guidelines on management of asthma and angina in adults in 
primary care: cluster randomised controlled trial. BMJ 2002;325:941.
 9 Rousseau N, McColl E, Newton J, et al. Practice based, longitudinal, 
qualitative interview study of computerised evidence based 
guidelines in primary care. BMJ 2003;326:314.
 10 Liberati EG, Ruggiero F, Galuppo L, et al. What hinders the 
uptake of computerized decision support systems in hospitals? A 
qualitative study and framework for implementation. Implement Sci 
2017;12:113.
 11 Petkus H, Hoogewerf J, Wyatt JC. AI in the NHS– are physicians 
ready? A survey of the use of AI & decision support by specialist 
societies, and their concerns. Clinical Medicine 2020;20:324–8.
 12 House of Lords Select Committee on AI. AI in the UK: ready, willing 
and able? London: UK Parliament, 2018.
 13 The Topol Review: preparing the healthcare workforce to deliver the 
digital future. NHS 2019.
 14 Commission. Artificial Intelligence for Europe. COM (2018) 237 final.
 15 Commission. Liability for emerging digital technologies. SWD(2018) 
137 final.
 16 Commission. Building Trust in Human- Centric Artificial Intelligence. 
COM (2019) 168 final.
 17 Independent High Level Expert Group on AI. Ethics Guidelines for 
Trustworthy AI. European Commission 2019.
 18 Independent High Level Expert Group on AI. Policy and Investment 
Recommendations for Trustworthy AI. European Commission 2019.
 19 Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies - New Technologies 
Formation, Liability for Artificial Intelligence and other emerging 
digital technologies. EU 2019.
 20 Commission. ‘Report on the safety and liability implications of 
Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things and robotics’ COM (2020) 
64 final.
 21 European Commission. ‘White Paper on AI: A European approach to 
excellence and trust’ COM (2020) 65 final.
 22 Adams CE, Montgomery AA, Aburrow T, et al. Adding evidence of the 
effects of treatments into relevant Wikipedia Pages: a randomised 
trial. BMJ Open 2020;10:e033655.
 23 O’Neill O. A question of trust. Cambridge University Press, 2002.
 24 O’Neill O. Autonomy and trust in bioethics. Cambridge University 
Press, 2002.
 25 O’Neill O. Linking trust to Trustworthiness. International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 2018;26:293–300.
 26 Jones K. Chapter 11, at 186. In: Archard D, ed. Distrusting the 
trustworthy. in reading Onora O'Neill. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.
 27 Baier A. Chapter 10, at 178. In: Archard D, ed. What is trust?. in 
reading Onora O'Neill. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.
 28 Hatherley JJ. Limits of trust in medical AI. J Med Ethics 
2020;46:478–81.
 29 Wyatt J, Spiegelhalter D. Evaluating medical expert systems: what to 
test and how? Med Inform 1990;15:205–17.
 30 O'Neill O. Experts, practitioners, and practical judgement. J Moral 
Philos 2007;4:154–66.
 31 Sample I. “It’s going to create a revolution”: how AI is transforming 
the NHS. The Guardian, 2018. Available: https://www. theguardian. 
com/ technology/ 2018/ jul/ 04/ its- going- create- revolution- how- ai- 
transforming- nhs
 32 Copestake J. Babylon claims its chatbot beats GPs at medical exam. 
BBC, 2018. Available: https://www. bbc. co. uk/ news/ technology- 
44635134
 33 Thimbleby H. Fix IT: Stories from Healthcare IT. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2020.
 34 Sackett DL, Rosenberg WM, Gray JA, et al. Evidence based 
medicine: what it is and what it isn't. BMJ 1996;312:71–2.
 35 Garg AX, Adhikari NKJ, McDonald H, et al. Effects of computerized 
clinical decision support systems on practitioner performance and 
patient outcomes: a systematic review. JAMA 2005;293:1223–38.
 36 Liu X, Cruz Rivera S, Moher D, et al. Reporting guidelines for clinical 
trial reports for interventions involving artificial intelligence: the 
CONSORT- AI extension. Nat Med 2020;26:1364–74.
 37 Liu JLY, Wyatt JC. The case for randomized controlled trials to 
assess the impact of clinical information systems. J Am Med Inform 
Assoc 2011;18:173–80.
 38 . Available: https:// ec. europa. eu/ info/ energy- climate- change- 
environment/ standards- tools- and- labels/ products- labelling- rules- 
and- requirements/ energy- label- and- ecodesign/ energy- efficient- 
products/ tyres_ en
 39 Murray E, Hekler EB, Andersson G, et al. Evaluating digital health 
interventions: key questions and approaches. Am J Prev Med 
2016;51:843–51.
 40 Narla A, Kuprel B, Sarin K, et al. Automated classification of skin 
lesions: from Pixels to practice. J Invest Dermatol 2018;138:2108–10.
 41 Fox J, Thomson R. Clinical decision support systems: a discussion 
of quality, safety and legal liability issues. Proc AMIA Symp 2002:1–7.
 42 Brahams D, Wyatt J. Decision AIDS and the law. Lancet 
1989;2:632–4.
 43 Cohen IG, Cops GH. Docs, and code: a dialogue between big 
data in health care and predictive policing. UC Davis Law Review 
2017;51:437–74.
 44 Hart A, Wyatt J. Evaluating black- boxes as medical decision 
AIDS: issues arising from a study of neural networks. Med Inform 
1990;15:229–36.
 45 EU Regulation on Medical Devices 2017/745.
 46 UK Government Department of Health and Social Care. Code of 
conduct of AI and other data driven technologies. London, 2019. 
Available: https://www. gov. uk/ government/ publications/ code- of- 
conduct- for- data- driven- health- and- care- technology
 47 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. Evidence standards 
framework for digital health technologies, 2019. Available: https://www. 
nice. org. uk/ about/ what- we- do/ our- programmes/ evidence- standards- 
framework- for- digital- health- technologies
 48 European Medicines Agency. Medical devices, 2019. Available: https://
www. ema. europa. eu/ en/ human- regulatory/ overview/ medical- devices
 49 Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency. Guidance: 
medical device stand- alone software including apps (including 
IVDMDs), 2018. Available: https://www. gov. uk/ government/ 
publications/ medical- devices- software- applications- apps
 50 . Available: https://www. legislation. gov. uk/ ukpga/ 2021/ 3/ contents/ 
enacted/ data. htm
 51 Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency. Medical 
devices UK Approved bodies, 2021. Available: https://www. gov. uk/ 
government/ publications/ medical- devices- uk- approved- bodies/
 52 European Commission. Guidance document - Classification of 
Medical Devices - MEDDEV 2.4/1 rev.9, 2015. Available: http:// ec. 
europa. eu/ DocsRoom/ documents/ 10337/ attachments/ 1/ translations
 53 UK Government Department for Business, Energy & Industrial 
Strategy. Guidance: CE marking, 2012. Available:https://www. gov. uk/ 
guidance/ ce- marking
 54 MHRA. Medical devices: conformity assessment and the UKCA 
mark. Available: https://www. gov. uk/ guidance/ medical- devices- 
conformity- assessment- and- the- ukca- mark
 55 Guidance using the UKNI marking, 2021Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy. Available: https://www. gov. uk/ 
guidance/ using- the- ukni- marking
 56 Yellow Card. Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency, 
2020. Available: https:// yellowcard. mhra. gov. uk/
 57 Joshi I, Joyce R. NHSX is streamlining the assurance of digital 
health technologies, 2019. Available: https:// healthtech. blog. gov. uk/ 
2019/ 11/ 01/ nhsx- is- streamlining- the- assurance- of- digital- health- 
technologies/
 58 FDA. Digital health software Precertification (Pre- Cert) program. from, 
2020. Available: https://www. fda. gov/ medical- devices/ digital- health- 











: first published as 10.1136/bm




8 Jones C, et al. BMJ Health Care Inform 2021;28:e100247. doi:10.1136/bmjhci-2020-100247
Open access 
center- excellence/ digital- health- software- precertification- pre- cert- 
program
 59 UK Government Digital Service. Technology code of practice, 2019. 
Available: https://www. gov. uk/ government/ publications/ technology- 
code- of- practice
 60 NHS Digital Clinical Safety team. DCB0129: clinical risk management: 
its application in the manufacture of health it systems and DCB0160: 
clinical risk management: its application in the deployment and use 
of health it systems. from, 2018. Available: https:// digital. nhs. uk/ data- 
and- information/ information- standards/ information- standards- and- 
data- collections- including- extractions/ publications- and- notifications/ 
standards- and- collections/ dcb0160- clinical- risk- management- its- 
application- in- the- deployment- and- use- of- health- it- systems
 61 Mahadevaiah G, RV P, Bermejo I, et al. Artificial intelligence‐based 
clinical decision support in modern medical physics: selection, 
acceptance, commissioning, and quality assurance. Med Phys 
2020;47:8.
 62 NHS Digital. Interoperability toolkit. Available: https:// digital. nhs. uk/ 
services/ interoperability- toolkit
 63 Walsh K, Wroe C. Mobilising computable biomedical knowledge: 
challenges for clinical decision support from a medical knowledge 
provider. BMJ Health Care Inform 2020;27:e100121.











: first published as 10.1136/bm
jhci-2020-100247 on 4 June 2021. D
ow
nloaded from
 
